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Transparent all-optical networks




Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM)
several “channels” per fiber
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Non-cooperative model
Large-scale networks: shortage of centralized control
provide incentives for users to work for the social
good
Social good: minimize fiber multiplicity
Charge users according to the maximum fiber
multiplicity incurred by their choice of frequency
and/or routing
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Non-cooperative model
Large-scale networks: shortage of centralized control
provide incentives for users to work for the social
good
Social good: minimize fiber multiplicity
Charge users according to the maximum fiber
multiplicity incurred by their choice of frequency
and/or routing
What will be the impact on social welfare if we allow users
to act freely and selfishly?
Evangelos Bampas — 1st AAAC Annual Meeting, University of Hong Kong, April 26-27, 2008 3/18
Problem formulation
Def. PATH MULTICOLORING problems:
input: graph G(V,E), path set P , # colors w
solution: a coloring c : P → W , W = {α1, . . . , αw}
goals:
minimize the sum of maximum color multiplicities
∑
e∈E maxα∈W µ(e, α) [NPZ01], or
minimize the maximum color multiplicity
µmax , maxe∈E maxα∈W µ(e, α) [AZ04]
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e1 L(e2) = 2
L = 3
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Game-theoretic formulation
Def. Given a graph G, path set P and w, define the
game 〈G,P,w〉:
players: p1, . . . , p|P | ∈ P
strategies: each pi picks a color ci ∈ W
strategy profile: a vector ~c = (c1, . . . , c|P |)
disutility functions: for pi ∈ P , fi(~c) = µ(pi, ci)
social cost:
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Def. Given a graph G, path set P and w, define the
game 〈G,P,w〉:
players: p1, . . . , p|P | ∈ P
strategies: each pi picks a color ci ∈ W
strategy profile: a vector ~c = (c1, . . . , c|P |)
disutility functions: for pi ∈ P , fi(~c) = µ(pi, ci)
social cost:





Def. S-PMC: the class of all 〈G,P,w〉 games
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Nash Equilibria
Def. A strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if no




i ∈ W : fi(~c; ci) ≤ fi(~c; c
′
i)
Def. ε-approximate Nash Equilibrium: no player can
reduce her disutility by more than a factor of 1 − ε
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Efficiency of Nash Equilibria




Def. The price of stability (PoS) of an S-PMC game:
PoS =
min~c is NE sc(~c)
µOPT
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Efficiency of Nash Equilibria




Def. The price of stability (PoS) of an S-PMC game:
PoS =
min~c is NE sc(~c)
µOPT
Rate of convergence to some NE?
by repeatedly changing some player’s strategy to
improve her disutility (Nash dynamics)
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Results in this work
Any Nash dynamics converges in at most 4|P | steps
Efficient computation of NE:
optimal NE for S-PMC(ROOTED-TREE)
1
2
-approximate NE for S-PMC(STAR)
Upper and lower bounds for the PoA:
# colors
minimum length of any path that contributes to the
cost of some worst-case NE
matching lower bounds for graphs with ∆ ≥ 3
constant for a large subclass of S-PMC(RING)
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Related work
Price of anarchy [KP99], price of stability [ADK+04]
Congestion games [MS96, Ros73]
player cost: SUM of delays of selected resources
large body of work
Bottleneck network games
player cost: MAX of delays along her path
players pick among several possible routings
[BM06]
latency functions on edges [BO06]
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Convergence to NE
Thm. Any Nash dynamics converges in at most 4|P | steps
consider the vector
(dL(~c), dL−1(~c), . . . , d1(~c))
lexicographic-order argument (attributed to Mehlhorn
in [FKK+02])
PoS = 1
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Convergence to NE
Thm. Any Nash dynamics converges in at most 4|P | steps
consider the vector
(dL(~c), dL−1(~c), . . . , d1(~c))
lexicographic-order argument (attributed to Mehlhorn
in [FKK+02])
PoS = 1
how many such vectors?
(
|P | + L − 1
|P |
)
≤ 2|P |+L−1 < 4|P |
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Efficient computation of optimal NE
〈G,P,w〉 is in S-PMC(ROOTED-TREE) if ∃r s.t. each
path in P lies entirely on some simple path from r to a
leaf
consider edges in BFS order: color paths with
min-multiplicity color in the partial solution
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A structural property of NE
If ~c is a NE, then for any pi ∈ P and for any α ∈ W
there is an e ∈ pi s.t. µ(e, α) ≥ fi(~c) − 1





red-blocking paths for pi
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An upper bound on the PoA
Thm. If sc(~c) = fi(~c) = µ̂ then PoA ≤ len(pi)
Proof.
all w colors are blocked along pi
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A matching lower bound
w = L = len(pi) = µ̂ = k
µOPT = 1
PoA = k
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What about graphs with degree 2?
Lem. In a NE of an S-PMC(RING) game, ∀ edge e and ∀αi
there is an arc s.t.:
∀αj the arc contains an αj-blocking edge for some
path that uses edge e and is colored with αi, and
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Lem. In a NE of an S-PMC(RING) game, ∀ edge e and ∀αi
there is an arc s.t.:
∀αj the arc contains an αj-blocking edge for some
path that uses edge e and is colored with αi, and





Repeated application of the Lemma in a worst-case NE









⇒ PoA ≤ 4
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Further work
Tackle convergence
Tighten the PoA analysis for rings
Selfish routing and wavelength assignment
Pricing mechanisms
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Further work
Tackle convergence
Tighten the PoA analysis for rings
Selfish routing and wavelength assignment
Pricing mechanisms
... Thank you!
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